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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
SUMMARY 
BARLOW-GRESHAM UNION HIGH SCHOOL 
DIST. NO.2 v. MITCHELL: ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AWARDED WHEN SETTLEMENT REACHED 
PRIOR TO DUE PROCESS HEARING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. 
Mitchell, l the Ninth Circuit held the Handicapped Children's 
Protection Act of 1986 (HCPA)2 allows the parents of a child 
with a disability3 to recover attorneys' fees from a school dis-
trict when settlement is reached prior to a due process hear-
ing. 4 The court found the parents in Mitchell were the 
prevailing party and no special circumstances rendered the 
award unjust.s 
The Ninth Circuit had previously determined that when 
parents prevail at the administrative hearing concerning their 
child's school placement, they are entitled to attorneys' fees 
under the HCPA.6 However, the question of whether the HCPA 
1. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Nelson, J., and Walker, J., U.S. 
District Judge, Northern District of California, sitting by designation). 
2. 20 U.S.C. § § 1415(e)(4) and 1415(1). These provisions amended section 1415 
of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), 20 U.S.C. § § 1400-85 (1990). The EHA 
was amended again in 1990 and is now known as the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act. 
3. This author wishes to use the term "disability" in lieu of "handicapped" to reflect 
the language used in the 1990 amendment of the EHA. 
4. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1285. 
5. Id. 
6. [d. at 1284. See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
21 
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allows attorneys' fees when settlement is reached before the 
administrative hearing was one of first impression for the 
Ninth Circuit.7 
II. FACTS 
Nineteen-year-old Wesley Mitchell (Wesley) attended 
Barlow-Gresham Union High School (BGUHS).8 Wesley 
received special education services9 due to his epilepsy and 
related behavioral and learning problems,lo and accordingly he 
had an individualized educational program (IEP).l1 On January 
31,1989, Wesley received a five-day suspension from BGUHS 
for assaulting three persons. 12 Thereafter, the school district 
developed a multi-disciplinary team which found Wesley's 
behavior may have been related to conditions which were part 
of his disability, and therefore, the school district was legally 
unable to expel him. 13 
On February 2, 1989, the school district filed an action in 
federal district court seeking injunctive relief4 to exclude 
7.Id. 
8. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 1282 
(9th Cir. 1991). Persons with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public edu-
cation ~etween the ages of three and twenty-one. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B). 
9. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1282. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) which provides 
"'special education' means specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or 
guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child .... " 
10. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1282. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) which defines 
"handicapped children" to include "other health impaired children ... who by reason 
thereof require special education and related services." 
11. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1282. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(19) which defines 
IEP as "a written statement for each handicapped child developed ... to meet the 
unique needs of handicapped children .... " 
12. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1282. The suspension accorded with school district pol-
icy and also state and federal law. Id. 
13. Id. Wesley's automatic expulsion would have violated the "stay-put provi-
sion" of20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) which provides "[dluring the pendency of any proceedings 
conducted pursuant to this section, unless ... otherwise agree[dl, the child shall remain 
in the then current educational placement .... " 
14. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1282. "In order to enjoin the student from attending 
school, there needs to be a showing that the student's current placement is substan-
tially likely to result in injury to himself or others." Id. The school district sought to 
change Wesley's placement prior to exhausting administrative remedies. Id. See Honig 
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) in which the Court found that section 1415(e)(3) "creates 
a presumption in favor of the child's current educational placement which school offi-
cials can overcome only by showing that maintaining the child in his or her current 
placement is substantially likely to result in injury to himself or herself or to others." 
Id. at 328. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/6
1992] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 23 
Wesley from attending BGUHS.16 The judge granted a 
temporary restraining order, extending Wesley's suspension 
until February 8, 1989, and then set a hearing date for the 
school district's preliminary injunction motion. 16 
Prior to filing the complaint, the school district gave the 
Mitchells notice that it intended to change Wesley's place-
ment from BGUHS to the school district's Central 
Administrative Office (CAO)Y The day after receiving the 
notice, the Mitchells objected to the school district's proposed 
placement and requested a due process hearing. 18 
The school district's complaint was amended at the pre-
liminary injunction hearing February 8, 1989, from termina-
tion of educational services to providing such services at CAO 
until the due process hearing, as stated in the prior notice. 19 
The judge at the evidentiary hearing found Wesley presented 
"a substantial likelihood of danger to himself or others. "20 The 
judge, therefore, issued a stipulated temporary restraining 
order prohibiting Wesley from returning to BGUHS and ordered 
the school district to provide services for Wesley at CAO pend-
ing the administrative hearing outcome.21 
At a February 21,1989, hearing the judge denied the school 
district's motion for the preliminary injunction, dissolved the 
temporary restraining order, and issued a stipulated order 
which indicated the parties' agreement that Wesley would 
15. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1282. In the original complaint the school district sought 
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction exclud-
ing Wesley from BGUHS for the rest of the school year. 1d. The school district also 
sought the court's permission to terminate its educational services. 1d. 
16. 1d. 
17. 1d. at 1282-83. This notice was pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) which 
provides "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to 
the ... educational placement of the child ....• Thus the notice stated the school dis-
trict would provide Wesley with individual tutoring ten hours per week at CAO and 
transportation to and from CAO by cab. 1d. at 1283. Note, the notice differs from the 
original complaint. See supra note 15 for original complaint contents. 
18. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1283. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) which provides 
"[wlhenever a complaint has been received ... the parents ... shall have an oppor-
tunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the State edu-
cational agency or by the local educational agency or intermediate educational unit, 
as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.· 
19. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1283. 
20. 1d. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
21. 1d. The Mitchells "were ordered to appear on February 21, 1989 to report on 
the progress of negotiations regarding compromise of the underlying complaint, the 
status of the administrative hearing process and to show cause why preliminary 
and permanent injunctive relief should not be granted against them.· 1d. 
3
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continue at CAO.22 Subsequently, the Mitchells filed an 
answer and counterclaim requesting attorneys' fees 23 and 
that Wesley be placed back at BGUHS.24 Before the next 
hearing date26 the parties settled on a new placement at 
BGUHS for Wesley.26 
To reflect the parties' settlement, the hearing officer 
issued a stipulated order of dismissal of the due process hear-
ing. 27 The district court dismissed the action,28 and the 
Mitchells filed for $18,642 in attorneys' fees pursuant to 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B).29 The judge granted the award, find-
ing it to be reasonable and finding the Mitchells to be the pre-
vailing party.30 The school district timely appealed.31 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's statutory 
interpretation of section 1415(e)(4)(B) de novo.32 Looking at the 
legislative history of the law,33 the court determined Congress 
22. [d. The court was informed the Mitchells had initiated an administrative pro-
ceeding and that the parties had temporarily agreed to keep Wesley at CAO. [d. 
23. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1283. The Mitchells also sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief. [d. 
24. [d. 
25. [d. The administrative hearing finally convened three months later and the 
hearing officer granted two continuances at the school district's request. [d. The first 
continuance was until May 22, 1989, and the second until June 30, 1989. [d. 
26. [d. The multi-disciplinary team recommended a new program, with two other 
students, which the parties agreed upon. [d. This agreement accorded with Wesley's 
IEP. [d. 
27. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1283. This order was issued on June 28, 1989. [d. 
28. [d. The action was dismissed without prejudice on July 27,1989. [d. All agree-
ments and orders of dismissal were silent to the issue of attorneys' fees. [d. 
29. [d. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) provides "[i]n any action or proceeding brought 
under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' 
fees as part of the costs to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who 
is the prevailing party." 
30. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1283. 
31. [d. 
32. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 
1284 (9th Cir. 1991). See Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1985) (In an award 
of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "any elements of legal analysis and statutory 
interpretation which figure in the district court's decision are reviewable de novo. "). 
33. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1284. See also Abu-Sahyun v. Palo Alto Unified 
School Diet., 843 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Although [section 1415(e)(4)(B)] 
grants the district court discretion to award fees, Congress intended [section 
1415(e)(4)(B)] to be interpreted consistent with fee provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
4
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intended it to be interpreted consistently with the fee provisions 
of 42 U.S.C. § 198854 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,36 which allow attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in the 
court's discretion. 
The Ninth Circuit also determined the HCPA clearly 
contemplated an award of attorneys' fees for parents, in 
certain circumstances, at the administrative level. s6 The 
court reasoned the law's reference to "any action or proceed-
ing"S7 included fees incurred prior to a due process determi-
nation. S8 The court also relied on previous Ninth Circuit 
decisions that held the HCPA provides attorneys' fees for 
parents who prevail at the administrative hearing. 59 
Since the Ninth Circuit had not decided the exact issue 
of whether 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) allows attorneys' fees 
when a settlement is reached prior to a due process hearing, 
it turned to other judicial decisions for guidance!O The court 
looked briefly at Maher v. Gagne,41 where the Supreme Court 
determined the "fact that respondent prevailed through a set-
tlement rather than through litigation, does not weaken 
[the party's] claim to [attorney's] fees."42 The court also relied on 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); S. REP. No. 112, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 
'2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1804 ("The committee also intends that 
[section 1415(e)(4)(B)] should be interpreted consistent with fee' provisions of 
statutes such as [T]itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which authorizes courts 
to award fees for time spent by counsel in mandatory administrative proceedings 
under those statutes."). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981) provides in pertinent part "the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs." 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(K) (1981) provides "the court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .... " 
36. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1284. 
37. [d. See supra note 29 for full text of20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B). 
38. [d. 
39. [d. See McSomebodies (No.1) v. Burlingame Elementary School Dist., 897 
F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 556 (1990); Mitten v. Muscogee County 
School Dist., 877 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); Duane 
M. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 861 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1988); Eggers v. Bullitt 
County School Dist., 854 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1988). 
40. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1284. 
41. 448 U.S. 122 (1980). 
42. [d. at 129. The Court further stated: 
Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District 
Court's power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or 
on a judicial determination that the plaintiffs rights have been 
violated. Moreover, the Senate Report expressly stated that 
"for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be 
5
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the Fifth Circuit case Shelly C. v. Venus Indep. School Dist.,43 
which held "attorneys' fees are available under the HCPA 
for work done prior to the holding of an administrative 
hearing. "44 
The court went on to examine Dodds v. Simpson,46 In 
Dodds, the district judge48 assumed it was in his dis-
cretion47 to deny the parents' request for attorney's fees 
expended prior to the due process hearing.48 The judge rea-
soned that under the particular circumstances, an attorney's 
fee award would have contravened the congressional purpose 
of avoiding costly litigation and would have acted as a disin-
centive to settlements at the administrative leve1.49 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded, however, that the district court in Mitchell 
had properly distinguished Dodds on its facts. 60 Thus, if the 
Mitchells could establish they had prevailed below, the Ninth 
considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights 
through a consent judgement or without formally obtaining 
relief." 
[d. (citations omitted). However, court proceedings were pending when the action in 
Maher settled. 
43. 878 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1989). In Shelly C., the parents requested a due pro-
cess hearing against the school district to settle a dispute over the IEP. [d. at 862. 
The parties settled prior to the due process hearing, and the parents then sued for attor-
neys' fees. [d. 
44. [d. at 864. However, the court did not determine if the plaintiff was actually 
entitled to fees and remanded the decision to the district court. [d. 
45. 1987-88 EHLR Dec. 559:320 (D. Or.). In Dodds, the parents requested a due 
process hearing to determine their son's special education eligibility. [d. at 321. The 
hearing was dismissed after a stipulation that their son had a learning disability and 
therefore was eligible for special education services. [d. The parents subsequently 
filed a civil rights suit in which they sought attorneys' fees against the school district. 
[d. The school district also moved for attorneys' fees. [d. At the trial, the jury found 
there was no civil rights violation. [d. 
46. [d. at 322. Judge Panner was the presiding Judge in both the Dodds deci-
sion and Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, No. 89-122 (D. 
Or. Dec. 18, 1989). 
47. [d. ("Assuming that under the new amendments I have discretion to award 
fees to a party who obtains the relief sought through settlement prior to an admin-
istrative hearing .... ") (emphasis added). 
48. [d. 
49. [d. 
50. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1285. The district court distinguished Dodds on the basis 
the parents in Dodds initiated the suit, whereas here, the school district initiated it. 
Mitchell, No. 89-122, slip op. at 6. Additionally, the district court emphasized "this 
does not mean that the parents acted improperly or failed to minimize the extent and 
costs of litigation because they vigorously contested Barlow-Gresham's action." [d. 
at 6-7. Wesley's parents had only two options: concede, or obtain counsel and defend. 
[d. at 6. Also relevant was the fact Barlow-Gresham had acted with extreme caution 
in light of the stay-put provision. [d. 
6
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Circuit was willing to allow attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(e)(4)(B).51 
B. PREVAILING PARTY 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's factual 
determination the Mitchells were the prevailing party under 
the clearly erroneous standard. 52 The court approved the dis-
trict court's comparison of the hearing officer's stipulated 
orderfi3 with the school district's prior notice54 in making the pre-
vailing party determination. 55 The court implicitly rejected the 
school district's claim that the prevailing party should be 
determined by gauging the "relative positions of the parties in 
the negotiations hearing as compared to their settlement 
positions. "56 
Since the stipulated order went against the school dis-
trict's desire to exclude Wesley from the school grounds, the 
court upheld the lower court's finding that the Mitchells pre-
vailed for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees. 57 
C. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
The school district claimed special circumstances of the case 
rendered the attorneys' fees award unjust.58 First, it claimed 
51. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1285. 
52. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 
1285 (9th Cir. 1991). See Sablan V. Department of Finance ofN. Mariana Islands, 856 
F.2d 1317, 1324 (9th Cir. 1988) (in a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action for attorneys' fees, the 
district court's factual determination of who is the prevailing party, "will not be set 
aside absent clear error"). 
53. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
54. See supra note 17 for text of prior notice. 
55. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1285. 
56. Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) which provides "written prior notice 
to the parents or guardian of the child whenever such agency or unit ... proposes to 
initiate or change ... educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appro-
priate public education to the child." See also supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
57. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1285. In this regard, the district court expressly 
found "that a major concern of Wesley's parents, and perhaps their most important 
concern, was that Wesley be permitted to attend school in as close to normal envi-
ronment as possible, so that he could improve his social skills." Mitchell, No. 89-122, 
slip op. at 8. Wesley's parents strongly objected to CAO because it denied Wesley "all 
opportunity to learn how to interact with his peers and manage the associated 
stresses." Id. 
58. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 V. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 
1285 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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such an award constituted a penalty "for its exemplary behav-
ior in response to the life threatening emergency posed by 
Wesley's violent behavior. "69 Secondly, the school district 
argued the award would create a disincentive to settlement. 60 
The Ninth Circuit rejected both of these contentions.61 
The court considered two factors in determining whether 
"special circumstances" exist to justify a denial of attorneys' 
fees: "(1) whether awarding fees would further the congres-
sional purpose in enacting the [Education of the Handicapped 
Act (EHA)], and (2) the balance of the equities."62 The EHA was 
enacted to ensure a free appropriate public education to all 
children with disabilities.63 Additionally, the 1986 amend-
ment makes attorneys' fees available to prevailing parents.54 
This amendment was intended to retroactively overrule Smith 
u. Robinson,66 a Supreme Court decision which held that 
because the statute contained no provision for attorneys' fees, 
they could not be awarded in actions brought to enforce these 
rights.66 Since the congressional intent behind the EHA and 
HCPA was to provide parents of children with disabilities 
substantive and legislative rights, including attorneys' fees if 
they prevail, the school district was left to argue only the sec-
ond factor of the special circumstances test, i.e.; equitable 
considerations.67 
59.Id. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. See Abu·Sahyun v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist., 843 F.2d 1250, 1252 
(9th Cir. 1988) (prevailing party should ordinarily be permitted attorney's fees absent 
special circumstances rendering award unjust). 
62. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1285. See Abu-Sahyun, 843 F.2d at 1253. As explained 
in note 2 supra, the EHA was amended with the HCPA in 1986. 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) provides: 
lilt is the purpose of this chapter to assure that all handi-
capped children have available to them, within the time 
periods specified ... a free appropriate public education 
which emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the 
rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians 
are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the 
education of all handicapped children, and to assess and 
assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped 
children. 
64. See supra note 29. 
65. 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
66. Id. at 1021. 
67. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1286. MClearly, the congressional intent with regard to 
the ERA and the HCPA was to provide parents of handicapped children a substantive 
right that could be enforced through the procedural mechanisms in the Act, includ-
ing a right to attorneys' fees if the parents prevail." Id. 
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In balancing the equities, the Ninth Circuit looked to its pre-
vious decision, Teitelbaum v. Sorenson,68 in which it found 
good faith by the losing party alone was not enough to consti-
tute a special circumstance to render an award of attorneys' 
fees unjust. 69 The court emphasized "attorney fees awards 
are not designed to penalize defendants, but are rather to 
encourage injured individuals to seek judicial relief. »70 
The court acknowledged the difficult situation the school 
district was in,71 but reprimanded the school district for 
intentionally attempting72 to unilaterally displace Wesley from 
BGUHS.73 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's finding of no special 
circumstances.74 
D. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
The Ninth Circuit determined the Mitchells were also enti-
tled to reasonable attorneys' fees on appea1.76 The court rea-
soned that since the Ninth Circuit finds 42 U.S.C. § 1988 fees 
available to prevailing parties for work on appeal, fees should 
also be made available here.76 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in Mitchell 77 addressed the issue of 
whether prevailing parents may be awarded attorneys' fees 
against a school district prior to reaching a due process admin-
istrative hearing. Based on the congressional intent of the 
68. 648 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981). 
69. [d. at 1250. 
70. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1286 (quoting Teitelbaum, 648 F.2d at 1251) (citations 
omitted). 
71. [d. See also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
72. [d. The school district's initial response of attempting to terminate all its edu-
cational services to Wesley and the fact the school district never amended its prior 
notice stating it wished to keep Wesley at CAO persuaded the court it acted inten-
tionally. [d. 
73. Mitchell, 940 F.2d at 1286. See supra note 17. 
74. [d. 
75. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 
1286 (9th Cir. 1991). The school district did not address this issue. Id. 
76. [d. See Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 490 (9th Cir.1988) 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035 (1990) (appellate fees awarded in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action). 
77. Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No.2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
9
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HCPA, the court found attorneys' fees were in fact available. 
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit has greatly increased the oppor-
tunities for parents to enforce the rights already due their 
children to a free appropriate public education under the EHA. 
Sara Vukson WinterO 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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